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ABSTRACT
SUPPORT FOR GESTALT VERSUS BUSINESS-AS-USUAL THEORIES OF
INSIGHT DEPENDS ON OPERATIONAL DEFINITION OF INSIGHT
Kimberly Diane Lee
Old Dominion University, 2015
Director: Dr. Ivan K. Ash

Some theories propose that insight involves automatic processes that are responsible for
restructuring. Other theories postulate that the mechanisms surrounding restructuring are
controlled and effortful. The current study tested these theories by comparing different
methodology and operational definitions that have been used in previous research to
investigate the nature of “Aha!” experiences and impasse in insightful problem solving.
One hundred two undergraduate psychology students from Old Dominion University
completed working memory tasks, six classic insight problems, and gave initial problem
representation ratings for the insight problems before solution attempt. Using a thinkaloud protocol, we assessed the occurrence of impasse during the problem solving phase.
After solving each problem, participants completed self-reported, measures of the Aha!
experience—solution confidence, how sudden a solution appeared, and the effort
required. Results demonstrated distinctly different response patterns between selfreported ratings of insight and the empirically coded measure of impasse when compared
with all other variables of interest. This suggests that the Aha! ratings lack construct
validity as an assessment of insight. Further, we replicated contradictory working
memory correlations found in previous research with the self-report ratings and impasse
coding, suggesting that discrepancies in the literature were the result of how insight was

assessed. These findings call into question previous research utilizing self-report Aha!
ratings.
Keywords: insight, problem solving, working memory, impasse, Gestalt
psychology
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Everyone has experienced sudden insight—that flash of understanding that seems
to come out of nowhere, from a place where no progress was being made; the Aha!
moment. These experiences feel qualitatively different from non-insightful problem
solving, e.g., solving an arithmetic equation, and researchers have long investigated
whether these two types of problem solving involve qualitatively different cognitive
processes. And if so, whether the feelings associated with the Aha! experience are truly
indicative of the underlying cognitive mechanisms.
Theories of insight have evolved into two competing classes: theories that stem
from Gestalt psychologists who proposed special, automatic processes that are specific to
insightful solutions (Ash & Wiley, 2006; Bowden & Jung-Beeman, 2003; Fleck, 2008;
Stellan Ohlsson, 2011) and theories that propose no differences between insightful and
non-insightful problem solving (Chein & Weisberg, 2013; Davidson, 1995; Gilhooly &
Murphy, 2005; Kaplan & Simon, 1990). As detailed in Ash, Cushen, and Wiley (2009),
difficulty in researching the insight phenomenon has resulted in various methodologies
and operational definitions of insight. We propose that these differences are responsible
for some of the conflicting evidence produced in the literature. The current study aimed
to reconcile these differences by testing predictions based on competing theory while
directly comparing several operational definitions of insight.

2
Historical Perspective
As an emerging scientific field, psychology was rooted in Associationist views
that became increasingly stringent over time (Ash, Jee, & Wiley, 2012). Culminating
with Behaviorism, this approach was confined to observable behaviors and their
contingent causes from the external world. Internal mental processes that might affect
learning and behavior were dismissed as unknowable or, at the most extreme,
nonexistent. Behaviorists attempted to explain all learning as a gradual, passive process
in which co-occurring stimuli become associated with a desired outcome. Thorndike's
(1911) famous "puzzle box" experiments exemplify this type of learning. For these
experiments, Thorndike created special puzzle boxes in which a cat was required to
activate some type of mechanism, e.g., a wire pull or a foot treadle, to gain freedom. To
begin, the cat would try many ineffectual means to escape the box. Eventually, it would
randomly release the correct mechanism and was rewarded with escape from
confinement. When returned to the box, the cat would again engage in ineffectual
activities until randomly alighting on the correct mechanism. Over time, the random
activities decreased as the cat slowly learned to associate the correct mechanism with the
door release.
It was from this constrained backdrop of Associationist learning theory that the
Gestalt movement was born. Gestalt theorists were dissatisfied with the notion that
human behavior could be wholly explained by passive, external connections. They
proposed that the internal representation of a problem or situation was paramount to the
external environment. Koffka (1935) spoke of two types of environments that influence
behavior: the geographical and the behavioral. The geographical environment
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encompasses the physical world and all the specific elements therein, e.g., the color,
texture, and weight of surrounding objects. The behavioral environment is how a person
interprets this information to form a mental representation which can depend on many
things including what they choose to focus on in the environment, the goals that are
motivating them, and their knowledge and previous experience with the environment or
its objects.
It is the changes that take place in the behavioral environment that were of
particular interest to the Gestalt psychologists. They believed that to solve certain types
of problems, a reorganization of the initial mental representation must occur, a process
known as restructuring (Duncker & Lees, 1945; Maier, 1931; Wertheimer, 1954/1959).
They also proposed that insight—the sudden realization of a problem's solution—follows
restructuring. Köhler (1948) was the first to demonstrate what appeared to be this type of
insightful learning. In one of his best-known experiments, Köhler provided a chimpanzee,
Sultan, with two hollow rods and bananas that were just out of reach from his cage. The
bananas could not be obtained by using either rod individually, but could be reached by
inserting the end of one rod into the other to create one long rod. Sultan unsuccessfully
attempted to obtain the bananas by using one of the short rods, a strategy that had
previously worked. He continued in this vein for an hour before giving up, having
reached impasse, a point in which active problem solving ceases and the solver is unsure
how to proceed. While sitting, he examined the rods and happened to hold them in a
straight line. Upon seeing the line, he inserted the end of one rod into the other and
immediately went to retrieve the bananas. In Gestalt parlance, the unsuccessful, singlerod technique was part of the initial, inappropriate problem representation which was
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later, after impasse, restructured to include the successful, double-rod strategy. Unlike
Thorndike’s cats, which required numerous trials to gradually associate the stimulus with
the desired outcome, Sultan appeared to experience one-trial learning as he immediately
connected the poles in future attempts. One-trial learning is at odds with Behaviorist
learning theory and Köhler's experiments lent credence to the idea of insightful learning.
Gestalt psychologists turned their attention to insightful problem solving in
humans, which required the development of laboratory techniques that would allow for
insight to occur. Insight problems are a particular type in which the problem itself
typically induces an inappropriate mental problem representation. The creation of this
faulty representation goes beyond the scope of the actual parameters presented in the
problem. Prior problem solving experience leads a solver to make assumptions about the
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Figure 1. The Gestalt theory of insight problem solving presented in an information
processing framework (Ash & Wiley, 2006).
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constraints of the problem space as well as additional operations or rules that must be
followed. The correct solution is not obtainable from this inappropriate representation
and the solver may reach a point in which they are no longer making progress towards the
goal state. After reaching this impasse, the problem representation must be restructured in
order to realize the correct solution (see Figure 1 for a diagram of the Gestalt view of
insight problem solving presented within an information processing framework).
Duncker's (1945) candle problem experiment illustrates this type of insight
inducing problem. In this experiment, participants were given candles, a matchbox with
matches, and some tacks. They were asked to affix the candle to the wall without
allowing wax to drip. In one condition, participants were given the matchbox with the
matches inside while the other group received an empty matchbox with the matches
separate. He found that participants were much more likely to solve the puzzle—tacking
the matchbox to the wall for use as a shelf for the candle—if they received an empty
matchbox. The full matchbox reinforced the function of the matchbox as a container, an
inappropriate mental representation for this problem reinforced by previous learning, and
fixation on this function made it more difficult for the participants to restructure their
problem representation to find the correct solution. Early researchers continued to make
contributions supporting the Gestalt concept of insight (Maier, 1931; Wertheimer,
1954/1959), but were not without detractors anchored in Associationist theory. This
conflict is echoed in modern insight problem solving research.
The Current State of Insight Problem Solving Research
Currently, there is a division in the literature regarding the processes that underlie
insight problem solving, specifically, restructuring. Restructuring is typically unnecessary
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in analytic, non-insight problems as the goal state can be reached through strategic means
from the initial, correct problem representation (e.g., arithmetic, Tower of Hanoi task).
As such, it is key to investigating processes that may be specific to insight. Some
researchers have proposed that automatic processes, such as spreading activation in
semantic memory (Ohlsson, 1992; 2011), chunk decomposition and constraint relaxation
(Knoblich, Ohlsson, Haider, & Rhenius, 1999), and switching between fine- and coursegrain processing (Jung-Beeman et al., 2004), are responsible for restructuring (Ash &
Wiley, 2006; Fleck, 2008; Schooler, Ohlsson, & Brooks, 1993). Others subscribe to the
Business-As-Usual theory which posits that insightful problem solving is no different
from analytic problem solving and the mechanisms involved in restructuring are
controlled and effortful (Chein & Weisberg, 2013; Davidson, 1995; Gilhooly & Murphy,
2005; Kaplan & Simon, 1990). To facilitate discussion, Gilhooly and Murphy (2005)
provided a useful framework for this debate: a dual process model.
Dual process models have been established as viable approaches to conceptualize
thinking (Evans, 2003, 2011; Kahneman, 2003; Stanovich & West, 2000). These models
distinguish between two systems of processing. System 1 is associated with automatic,
fast processing which is not under conscious control or subject to the limitations of
working memory. System 2 is associated with deliberate, sequential processing and is
constrained by the demands of working memory. Evans (2008) advocated a semantic
change that relates this division as types of processing as opposed to systems of
processing. He reasoned that though the processes associated with System 2 are relatively
stable across the literature, the processes labeled as System 1 are widely varied and better
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conceptualized as types of processes that fall under the umbrella of the attributes
associated with it.
Investigations specific to the debate surrounding the Type 1 or Type 2 processes
involved in insight problem solving often depend on working memory performance.
Working memory is a system that allows for temporary storage and management of
information (Engle, Tuholski, Laughlin, & Conway, 1999). It is constrained by a very
limited capacity and is typically measured by performance on a primary task while
concurrently managing a secondary task. This methodology is used to measure an
individual's capacity for controlled processes, such as focusing attention. By correlating
working memory, the hallmark of Type 2 processing, to problem solving performance or
to certain stages of the problem solving process, researchers can infer whether Type 1 or
Type 2 processes are dominant.
Working Memory and Restructuring
Ash and Wiley (2006) recognized that Type 2 processes are involved in the
insight problem solving process even within the scope of automatic restructuring theories.
They argued that insightful solutions begin with the same strategic, analytic procedures
used in non-insightful problem solving which are employed within the initial search
phase through the faulty problem space. These procedures utilize Type 2 processes as the
solver directs attentional resources towards accomplishing their goal. Accordingly, both
automatic restructuring theories and Type 2 restructuring theories allow for the impact of
individual differences in working memory on insight problem solving ability when
considering the entire process, though only Type 2 restructuring necessitates it. To
investigate restructuring within this line of reasoning, Ash and Wiley isolated the
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restructuring phase with an experimental approach. They designed two sets of matched
insight problems. Matching problems shared the same instructions, but more importantly,
shared the same representational change that must occur during restructuring to find the
correct solution, i.e., the problems were solved in the same manner. The difference
between the two sets was that one set was simplified so that the initial faulty problem
space was small and exhausted almost immediately. The other set allowed for many
possible moves within the initial faulty problem space so that it took more time before the
solver exhausted the problem space and came to impasse. By effectively eliminating the
pre-impasse stage from the simplified set, Ash and Wiley could make inferences about
the restructuring phase by comparing solving ability from the two sets with working
memory capacity. They found that working memory correlated to solution rates for the
large initial problem space set, with higher working memory span participants solving
more insight problems, but did not correlate with the small initial problem space set. As
Type 2 restructuring would predict a relationship between working memory and both
problem sets, these results were interpreted as relating Type 2 processes to the initial,
faulty search phase, but not with the restructuring phase, supporting the Gestalt theory of
automatic restructuring.
Ricks, Turley-Ames, and Wiley (2007) explored the relationship between
working memory and compound remote associates (CRA) problems. These problems
were originally developed for the Remote Associates Test by Mednick (1968) as a way to
test creative problem solving. As this type of problem can be experienced as either an
insight or non-insight problem depending on individual differences, they have become a
popular means of studying insight (e.g., Bowden & Jung-Beeman, 2003; Cunningham,
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MacGregor, Gibb, & Haar, 2009; Jung-Beeman et al., 2004; Kounios et al., 2006). In a
CRA problem, the solver is presented with a set of three seemingly unrelated words, e.g.,
aid, rubber, wagon. They are then tasked with finding a fourth word that will pair with
each of the three cue words. In this example, band is the correct solution: band-aid,
rubber band, bandwagon. Successful CRA solutions require the solver to efficiently
search long term memory stores to produce solution attempts, reject inappropriate
solutions, and keep the inappropriate solutions from interfering with subsequent searches.
As these processes are managed by Type 2 mechanisms, Ricks et al. argued that
individual differences in working memory would predict CRA performance. But they
were particularly interested in the idea that increased working memory capacity could
sometimes handicap the CRA problem solving process. They posited that the increased
attentional focus afforded to participants with higher working memory spans could
amplify inappropriate response fixation.
To test this hypothesis, Ricks et al. used two sets of CRA problems: a neutral set
and a set that was designed to mislead the solver into selecting an inappropriate,
knowledge domain-oriented response. They then explored the effect of working memory
in solvers who had differential levels of domain knowledge on these two sets. They found
that working memory did predict solution success in the neutral set as well as with
solvers with low domain knowledge in the domain misleading set. But solution success
was significantly hampered in the domain misleading set for participants with high
working memory spans and high levels of domain specific knowledge, who solved even
fewer CRA problems than participants with average working memory. These results
confirmed that Type 2 processes are involved in CRA problem solving, as well as
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indicated that the working memory sub-processes responsible for individual differences
are linked to attentional focus. However, it is important to note that this study examined
CRA problems in general and did not attempt to differentiate between insightful and noninsightful solutions.
Fleck (2008) compared insight and analytic problems using measures of fluid
intelligence, verbal and spatial short term memory, and working memory. Restructuring,
defined here as representational change from the initial problem representation to the
final solution, was assessed through a verbal protocol in which solvers verbalized their
problem solving process and through retrospective reports. To begin, Fleck confirmed
that restructuring took place at a high frequency in the insight problems, but low
frequency in the analytic problems. She also found that working memory strongly
predicted solution success in analytic problems, but not in insight problems. However,
insight solutions were predicted by verbal short term memory, a component of working
memory, which was not predictive of analytic success. These results provided evidence
of distinct processing between analytic and insightful solutions and were interpreted as
support for automatic restructuring theories.
Gilhooly and Fioratou (2009) also found support for process differences between
insightful and analytic problem solving. Using a large problem set—much larger than
previously used in this line of research—they investigated the relationship between
problem type and verbal working memory, spatial working memory, inhibition, and
switching. They found that both verbal and spatial working memory predicted solution
success in insight problems, but the executive functions of inhibition and switching did
not. For analytic problems, they found that working memory as well as switching
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contributed to problem solving. These processes differences were interpreted, in part, as
support for automatic restructuring. However, it is important to note that Gilhooly and
Fioratou relied on previous research to define insightful versus analytic problems and did
not attempt to assess the actual occurrence of restructuring.
Chein and Weisberg (2013) used a self-report method to identify the occurrence
of insight in CRA problems. After solving a problem, they asked participants to rate their
problem solving experience on a 4-point Aha! rating scale anchored at Strategy and
Insight. They explained that a problem solved by strategy is one in which the solver
comes upon the correct solution unawares, and only through an effortful, strategic
process, e.g., a trial-and-error process, can the solver confirm the accuracy of the
solution. Sudden insight "means that as soon as you thought of the word, you knew that it
was the answer. The solution word came with a feeling that it was correct ('It popped into
my head'; 'Of course!'; 'I had an Aha!')" (Appendix B, para. 1-3). Responses were then
used to categorize problems as analytic or insightful. They found that working memory
positively correlated to solution success in problems classified as insightful, a finding
they argued indicated the presence of Type 2 processes throughout the entire problem
solving process. They also found that solution times were significantly faster for
problems identified as involving insight. This is at odds with the Gestalt view which
predicts slower solving times for insightful solutions since a solver must first exhaust a
faulty problem space before obtaining the solution. These results were interpreted as
support for Type 2 restructuring and the Business-As-Usual theory.
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Assessing Restructuring
Insight problem solutions are often distinguished by the Aha! experience. Unlike
analytic problems in which incremental progress is felt, insight solutions seem to occur
unexpectedly with little to no prior feeling of progress being made towards the goal state
(Metcalfe & Wiebe, 1987). This sudden solution realization can be accompanied by a
strong feeling that is typically described as an Aha! experience or a Eureka! moment.
Because of the challenges inherent in experimentally isolating stages of the problem
solving process or even in identification of the insight phenomenon, this subjective Aha!
experience is often used to determine the occurrence of insight, and more specifically
restructuring.
Bowden and Jung-Beeman (2003) used these feelings to establish correlations
with neurological activity during CRA problem solving, developing the first instance of
the Aha! rating scale (also, Jung-Beeman et al., 2004). After solving each problem, they
asked solvers to rate their problem solving experience on a single continuum in terms of
strategy versus insight. They found sudden bursts of brain activity just prior to solution
realization in problems that were identified as occurring with an Aha! experience, but not
with problems that were solved strategically. As the activity preceded the solution, these
bursts were interpreted as an automatic process occurring beyond the solvers control.
As previously described, Chein and Weisberg (2013) used a streamlined version
of this measure in their work. But this Aha! rating scale has the potential to create
confounded results. The anchors do not reflect a single construct leaving room for
subjective interpretations and response confusion that would not be available in a scale
anchored between extremes, e.g., Not and Very. Further, several constructs are inherent in
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the instructions: solution confidence, how sudden a solution manifests, and the amount of
effort involved in the process. If these constructs are not highly related, results would be
influenced by which component felt most pertinent at the time of the rating. For example,
a participant who happens to solve a problem quickly and easily, without impasse or
restructuring, would likely choose an insight rating because they did not feel the process
was effortful or that they actively employed a strategy. Or perhaps they interpreted
suddenness in terms of how quickly they obtained the answer. Conversely, a solver who
realizes the solution after impasse and restructuring, may choose a strategic rating
because they expended a lot of mental resources and tried many strategies before coming
to the solution.
At no point in previous research has the validity been assessed for this scale. Even
if the three constructs inherent in the scale consistently relate with one another when
assessing insight, the subjective feelings associated with the Aha! experience may not be
reliable indicators of restructuring. Ash et al. (2009) argued against conflating the
experience of an Aha! moment with the process of restructuring. Gleaning evidence from
previous research, they highlighted vulnerabilities implicit when solvers are asked to
assess their own metacognitive processes. Further, no information processing theory of
automatic restructuring includes feelings as mechanisms of the insight problem solving
process. Rather, these Aha! feelings are an epiphenomenon that be explained by the
theories.
However, all automatic restructuring theories denote the importance of impasse in
activating the restructuring process that must occur in insightful solutions. As such, Ash
et al. (2012) chose to operationally define the occurrence of insight as solution after
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impasse. In this study, impasse was empirically assessed using a think-aloud protocol.
Using both insight problems and arithmetic problems, they found that this method of
coding the restructuring phase confirmed predictions based on the Gestalt theory of
insight. They assessed initial problem representation through importance ratings
administered prior to the solving phase and found that problems solved without impasse
began with a more appropriate initial problem representation than problems solved with
impasse, confirming the assumption that insightful solutions begin with a faulty problem
representation. They also found that problems involving impasse took markedly longer to
solve than problems solved without impasse. This result supported Gestalt theory, but
was directly contradicted by Chein and Weisberg's (2013) finding that problems
involving an Aha! experience were solved much faster than those categorized as
analytical. Lastly, Ash et al. found that none of these observations were echoed in the
data from the arithmetic problems indicating a qualitative distinction between analytical
and insightful problem solving.
Current Study
We propose that conflicting evidence in the literature regarding working memory
and the insight process is a product of how insightful solutions have been assessed. Ash
and Wiley (2006) isolated the restructuring phase by manipulating the initial problem
space, but did not attempt to confirm the occurrence of restructuring. Ricks et al. (2007)
did not attempt to assess restructuring at all. Fleck (2008) attempted to assess
restructuring, but chose representational change as the operational definition instead of
solution after impasse. Gilhooly and Fioratou (2009) relied on previous research to
differentiate between insightful and analytic problems and did not attempt to confirm the
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occurrence of restructuring. Chein and Weisberg (2013) attempted to assess restructuring,
but used a self-report method that has not been validated, finding results that contradicted
previous research.
We also propose that the self-report Aha! rating scale is specifically responsible
for the contradictory findings that Chein and Weisberg (2013) reported. This scale had
not been tested for its psychometric soundness and there was no evidence that it
displayed construct validity or that it was even related to impasse and restructuring.
Further, we propose that the subjective, self-reported feelings associated with insight are
a questionable means for coding restructuring. As all theories of insight indicate that
restructuring occurs after impasse, we argue that empirically coding for impasse is a more
theoretically valid method of assessing the occurrence of restructuring.
The two major goals of this study were to 1) test the validity of the Aha! rating
scale and 2) to test predictions based on automatic restructuring and Type 2 restructuring
theories using different operational definitions of insight.
To test the validity of the Aha! rating, we separated the scale into the three
dimensions of insight articulated within the scale's instructions: confidence, suddenness,
and effort. We further reduced the opportunity for response confusion by anchoring each
scale with extremes, Not and Very. If the Aha! rating scale possesses strong construct
validity, we expected that these three ratings would be highly correlated for correctly
solved problems. If the Aha! rating scale demonstrates convergent validity, we expected
that these three ratings would be highly correlated with solution after impasse. To further
confirm convergent validity, we expected that the Aha! ratings would closely mirror
impasse results for all remaining hypothesis testing.
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All theories of insight assume that insightful solutions begin from an inaccurate
problem representation. Using initial problem representation ratings, we expected to
confirm this assumption with all four operational definitions of insight: high confidence,
high suddenness, low effort, and solution after impasse.
Gestalt theory predicts longer solving times for insightful solutions as they require
the solver to exhaust an inappropriate problem space before entering impasse. Ash et al.
(2012) provided evidence to support this prediction. Using the Aha! rating scale, Chein
and Weisberg (2013) found the opposite: that insightful solutions were associated with
faster solving times than non-insightful solutions. We attempted to replicate these
findings using the four different definitions of insight.
Finally, the Gestalt theory of insightful problem solving proposes that
restructuring is an automatic process that does not involve attention. This predicts a
weaker correlation between solution success and working memory for problems solved
with restructuring than for problems solved without restructuring. The Business-As-Usual
theory proposes that restructuring involves Type 2 processes that are controlled and
effortful. This predicts that correlations between working memory and solution success
should be equally high whether the solution is insightful or not. We assessed these
predictions by comparing solution success with working memory for all four definitions
of insight.
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CHAPTER 2
METHOD

Participants
One hundred two Old Dominion University undergraduate psychology students
volunteered to participate in this study (79.4% women; Mage = 21.15, SD = 5.49, age
range: 18–53; 93.1% native English speakers; 74.5% had college algebra within five
years; 28.4% psychology majors; see Tables 1 and 2 for further demographic
information). A power analysis was conducted using G*Power 3.1 (Faul, Erdfelder,
Buchner, & Lang, 2009; Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007) to determine the
necessary sample size of 72 to detect an effect size of .28 with 80% power using a
bivariate correlation and alpha set at .05. The effect size used in this analysis was based
on results from Ash and Wiley (2006) and chosen as a more conservative estimate of the
relationship between working memory and insight problem solving ability than other
reported effect sizes in the literature. Participants were required to be at least 18 years of
age and have normal or normal-to-corrected vision. Participants were recruited through
the Department of Psychology's online research participation system and received one
and a half research credits for their participation. This study was approved by Old
Dominion University's Institutional Review Board (IRB) and ethical guidelines set forth
by the American Psychological Association were followed. All participants signed an
IRB approved Informed Consent Form that explained their rights as a volunteer
(Appendix A).

18
Table 1
Participant Demographic Frequency Data
n

%

Sex
Female
Male
Total

81
21
102

79.4
20.6
100.0

English
English has ALWAYS been my primary language.
English has been my primary language for MORE than 10 years.
English has been my primary language for LESS than 10 years.
English has been my primary language for LESS than 5 years.
English is NOT my primary language.
Total

95
2
0
2
3
102

93.1
2.0
0.0
2.0
2.9
100.0

Algebra
I've had a college level algebra class in the past 5 years.
I've had a college level algebra class in the past 10 years.
I've had a college level algebra class more than 10 years ago.
I've NEVER had a college level algebra class.
Total

76
5
1
20
102

74.5
4.9
1.0
19.6
100.0

Table 2
Participant Major Frequency Data
Accounting
Biology
Business Management
Business Management / Psychology
Chemistry
Civil Engineering
Criminal Justice
Criminal Justice / Sociology
Dental Hygiene
Electrical Engineering Technology
Engineering
Exercise Science
Health Science
Human Services
Industrial Technology
Interdisciplinary Studies
Marine Biology / Applied Mathematics

n
1
10
1
1
1
1
8
1
4
1
1
6
1
5
2
1
1

%
1.0
9.8
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
7.8
1.0
3.9
1.0
1.0
5.9
1.0
4.9
2.0
1.0
1.0
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Table 2 (continued)
Mechanical Engineering
Nuclear Medicine Technology
Nursing
Occupational and Technical Studies Training Specialist
Parks and Recreation Management
Parks, Recreation, and Tourism
Physical Education
Pre Medical Biology
Psychology
Total

n
1
1
14
1
1
1
1
1
29
102

%
1.0
1.0
13.7
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
28.4
100.0

Materials
All sections of this study, with the exception of the problem solving phase, were
administered on a Dell Optiplex 780 computer running Windows Vista with a monitor set
to a resolution of 1280  1024 pixels. The tasks were programmed using E-Prime 2.0
software (Schneider, Eschman, & Zuccolotto, 2012a, 2012b). During the problem solving
phase, participants completed the insight problems with paper and pencil while the Aha!
ratings were administered on the computer.
Insight problems. This study used problems selected from Ash and Wiley (2006;
2008; see Appendix B). These problems have been classified as insight problems in
previous research because they tend to elicit an incorrect initial problem representation in
which a final solution cannot be found unless restructuring of the problem occurs. To be
able to assess initial problem representation, a final criterion in selection was that each
problem could be broken down into discrete components that were easily coded for
importance in the final solution.
Initial problem representation ratings. Using a method developed by Ash &
Wiley (2008), we assessed initial problem representation by having participants rate each
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a) Coins Problem: In this problem, there are 8 coins. Move 2 coins so that each coin
touches exactly 3 other coins. The coins will need to be separated into two groups.

b) Coins problem solution.

c) Component importance coding.

Figure 2. The coins problem, its solution, and how key and distractor components (each
coin) are coded for importance in the final solution. Participants are asked to rate the
importance of each coin on a scale of (1) Not Important to (7) Very Important. Scores for
the key components are averaged together and scores for the distractor components are
reverse coded, then averaged together. A final representation score is created by
averaging these two scores together.

component of the insight problems for their importance in finding the solution. For
example, the insight problem illustrated in Figure 2 shows a collection of coins with the
instructions, In this problem, there are 8 coins. Move 2 coins so that each coin touches
exactly 3 other coins. The coins will need to be separated into two groups. In this
problem, there are only two coins that can be moved to create the final, correct solution.
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These two coins are key components and are coded as being used in the solution (1),
while all other coins are distractor components and are coded as not being used in the
solution (0). Participants were presented with an image of the problem with the
component they were rating colored red. They were asked to rate How important will the
coin in red be in finding the solution? on a scale of (1) Not Important to (7) Very
Important.
Before entering the rating phase, they were instructed to give immediate
impressions and to quickly rate each component without attempting to solve. To
accommodate for the varying number of components in each problem, a weighted mean
was used to create a final representation rating. Ratings for key components were
averaged together and ratings for distractor components were reverse coded, then
averaged together. These two scores were averaged together to create an overall initial
problem representation rating in which higher scores indicated better initial problem
representation.
Aha! ratings. To investigate the subjective feelings associated with insight
problem solving, participants were asked to rate their problem solving experience on
three dimensions: confidence, suddenness, and effort. Ratings were made on a 4-point
scale upon completion of each problem. Participants were asked, How confident are you
in your solution?, anchored at (1) Not Confident and (4) Very Confident; How sudden did
the solution come to you?, anchored at (1) Not Sudden and (4) Very Sudden; and How
much effort was required to find the solution?, anchored at (1) Not Effortful and (4) Very
Effortful. Instructions for these ratings included detailed descriptions for each dimension
(Appendix C). To replicate the dichotomous insight coding used by Chein and Weisberg
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(2013), scores of one or two were collapsed into a single non-insightful category and
scores of three or four were similarly collapsed as insightful for both confidence and
suddenness ratings. Effort was reverse coded as non-insightful for scores of three or four
and insightful for scores of one or two.
Impasse coding and think-aloud protocol. In this study, we empirically
assessed impasse utilizing a think-aloud protocol. During the problem solving phase,
participants were asked to continuously describe their mental processes. The think-aloud
protocol for this phase was video recorded for later data coding. Before beginning the
problem solving phase, the experimenter read the following:
Using the packet provided, you will have four minutes to solve each
problem. There is one problem per page. You must show ALL YOUR
WORK for each problem and CIRCLE the final answer. You may explain
your solution in writing, arrows, or other diagrams as necessary as long as
the solution is clear. ALL problems have a solution and answers such as
"impossible" or "not solvable" will be counted as incorrect. So that we can
understand what you are doing while you solve each problem, you will
talk through your problem solving process out loud. This section will be
video recorded for later data coding.
This ‘think aloud’ process should be like a stream of
consciousness: whatever is going on in your mind is what you should
verbalize. If you are reading the problem, read it out loud. If you are
writing on the paper, verbalize what you are doing. Verbalize anything
you are thinking and be sure to keep talking through the entire process.
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You will not be given any feedback regarding how close you are to
solution or the accuracy of your solution, but you will be reminded to keep
talking if you stop verbalizing during the process. Please remember to
speak loud enough for the video recording.
After completing each problem, you will be asked three rating
questions (on the computer) that describe your problem solving process.
You will enter your response by using the mouse to click on your choice.
After completing the rating questions, you will wait for the experimenter
before continuing to solve the next problem.
We will now do a practice problem so you can get used to the think
aloud protocol and see how the rating questions work. When you are ready
to begin, you will turn the practice page over and read the instructions out
loud. After you read the instructions, I will ask if you are ready to begin. I
will then begin the four minute timer. When you have the solution, RAISE
YOUR HAND and I will stop the timer. You will then answer the rating
questions on the computer using the mouse. REMEMBER TO KEEP
THINKING OUT LOUD. Do you have any questions?
The videos were later coded by four independent raters looking for the occurrence
of impasse. Following the impasse coding procedure outlined in Ash et al. (2012), the
operational definition of impasse was taken from Knoblich, Ohlsson, Haider, and
Rhenius (1999) who define impasse as the "cessation of overt problem-solving behavior"
which is "accompanied by a subjective feeling of not knowing what to do" (p. 1534).
Raters looked for instances that supported this definition: periods of silence, especially
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Table 3
Inter-rater Reliability for Impasse Coding
Cohen's
kappa
SE
Coder 1 x Coder 2
.82
0.07
Coder 1 x Coder 3
.84
0.06
Coder 1 x Coder 4
.84
0.06
Coder 2 x Coder 3
.80
0.07
Coder 2 x Coder 4
.76
0.08
Coder 3 x Coder 4
.78
0.07
Note. n = 93.

p
< .001
< .001
< .001
< .001
< .001
< .001

95% CI
Lower
Upper
.68
.95
.71
.96
.72
.96
.66
.94
.61
.91
.63
.92

after reminders to continue the verbal protocol, verbal indications of impasse such as "I
don't know what to do" or "I'm lost", physical stillness in which the participant ceased to
actively write or point to the problem, verbal expressions of frustration or frustrated body
language, and mindless repetition of the instructions. All raters reviewed a subset of 93
problems in which Cohen's kappa was used to assess agreement between raters. Using
Altman's (1991) standards of agreement, agreement between raters ranged from good,
κ = .76, p = < .001, 95% CI [.61, .91], to very good, κ = .84, p = < .001, 95% CI [.72, .96]
(Table 3).
Video for the think-aloud protocol was captured with a Panasonic PV-GS150
digital video camcorder on a Macintosh computer running Mac OS X using SecuritySpy
software. The tripod mounted camcorder was positioned approximately four and a half
feet in front of the seated participant (Figure 3).
Working memory tasks. Working memory capacity was measured using
replications of Kane et al.'s (2004) reading span task (RSPAN) and operation span task
(OSPAN). These are dual-process tasks that require participants to maintain information
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Figure 3. Laboratory set-up for this experiment. Participants were seated at the computer
to the left and the experimenter was seated at the computer to the right. The camera was
positioned approximately four and a half feet in front of the participant.

while concurrently executing a secondary task. Working memory capacity is then
assessed by performance on information recall. For analysis, a single working memory
score was created by averaging the standardized composite scores from both the RSPAN
and OSPAN.
Reading span task. The RSPAN task requires participants to retain, then later
recall a set of letters from their short-term memory. While attempting to retain these
letters, a secondary reading comprehension task must be completed. In this task,
participants are presented with a sentence that they must read aloud. All sentences are
grammatically correct, but in half of the sentences a noun has been replaced with an
irrelevant noun rendering the sentence nonsensical. The participant must state whether
the sentence makes sense or not by indicating "yes" or "no". The sentences are followed
by a letter that the participant must read aloud and attempt to retain. For example, if the
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participant is presented with the following, Andy was stopped by the policeman because
he crossed the yellow heaven. ? R, they should say: “Andy was stopped by the
policeman because he crossed the yellow heaven... no… r.” After the participant reads
the letter aloud, the experimenter immediately advances to the next stimulus screen. After
a certain number of these sentences and letters, the participant is cued to write down all
the letters they can recall from that particular set in the order they occurred. The sets
range from two to five letters and each set size is repeated three times with new stimuli
for a total of 12 sets (see Appendix D for complete stimuli list). Each recalled set is
graded on the total number of letters recalled divided by the total number of letters
presented in that set. This is an all or nothing grading in which credit is only given if all
letters in the set are reproduced in the correct order. A final composite RSPAN score is
created by summing the weighted set scores.
Operation span task. The OSPAN task follows the same procedure as the
RSPAN with two differences: the primary memory task asks participants to recall a set of
words instead of letters and the secondary task has been replaced with a simple arithmetic
equation and solution in which the participant must decide if the solution presented is
correct (e.g., IS (9 ÷ 3) + 2 = 2 ? AUNT; see Appendix E for complete stimuli list).
Reliability and validity. Both working memory tasks have been adapted from
Engle et al. (1999) in which short term memory tasks, working memory tasks, general
fluid intelligence, and both the verbal and math portions of the Scholastic Aptitude Test
(SAT) were examined for divergent and convergent construct relationships. Using factor
analysis and structural equation modeling, their results supported that these are distinct,
though related constructs. Also using structural equation modeling techniques, Kane et al.
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(2004) investigated the relationship between verbal working memory tasks (RSPAN and
OPSAN) and spatial working memory tasks. They found that the two categories share
70%–80% of their variance indicating that working memory tasks, regardless of domain
specification, largely measure a domain-general construct. They further reported that the
RSPAN and OSPAN have good reliability with Cronbach's alphas of .78 and .80
respectively. In this study, the RSPAN and OSPAN together were found to be reliable,
producing a Cronbach's alpha of .84.
Procedure
Participants were recruited via the Psychology Department's online research
participation system. They attended their individual, one and a half hour session at a
laboratory located on the campus of Old Dominion University. Upon arrival, they were
seated at a computer station and given time to read and sign the Informed Consent Form.
After the participants signed the form, they proceeded through the experimental phases
(Figure 4). A balanced Latin square approach was used to produce six order conditions
for the insight problems. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the six order

Initial Problem
Representation
Ratings Phase for
Insight Problems

Working
Memory:
Reading
Span Task

Working
Memory:
Operation
Span Task

Insight
Problem
Solving Phase
& Aha! Ratings

Cognitive
Reflection
Test

Figure 4. Experiment procedural flow. A balanced Latin square approach was used to
produce six order conditions for the insight problems. Participants were randomly
assigned to one of the six order conditions. This order condition was maintained for the
initial problem representation phase as well as for the problem solving phase. During the
problem solving phase, each insight problem was followed by three Aha! ratings.
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conditions. This order condition was maintained for the initial problem representation
phase as well as for the problem solving phase. All directions were read aloud by the
experimenter, but were also represented on the computer screen so that the participant
could read along with them. Each section contained a practice phase.
Participants began with the initial problem representation phase in which each
insight problem was presented and the participant was asked about their familiarity with
the problem as well as to rate the importance of the problem components. They then
completed the working memory phase, first the RSPAN and then the OSPAN, and
continued with the problem-solving phase and think-aloud protocol. After completion of
each insight problem, the participant gave their Aha! ratings on the computer before
continuing to the next problem. Following the problem solving phase, participants took
the Cognitive Reflection Test. This section was a pilot test for future research and will
not be discussed at this time. At the conclusion of the experiment, the participant was
debriefed, allowed to ask questions, and asked to refrain from discussing the experiment
with others in the research pool.
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CHAPTER 3
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Data Screening
Thirteen participants were removed from all analyses for a final sample size of 89.
Of these 13, six participants did not finish the experiment and were removed due to
incomplete data. We reduced the potential for confounded results caused by language
difficulties by removing seven participants who indicated that English was not their
primary language (including two previously mentioned as missing data). Using criteria
set forth by Engle et al. (1999), participants must have maintained at least 85% accuracy
on the secondary working memory tasks to be retained for analyses. This reduces the
potential for biased or inaccurate working memory scores (e.g., participants who are
attempting to employ rehearsal or other mnemonic strategies to improve their recall
performance or participants who may have language difficulties). Five participants failed
to meet this minimum requirement (including three previously mentioned for removal
due to missing data or language).
Overall Analysis Strategy
Not all solvers experience insight while completing classic insight problems. To
this end, it is necessary to analyze the data at the level of observation. This allows for
participants with differential insight and solution rates to contribute to the different
categories of observation, e.g., solution success, impasse, and confidence. To
accommodate the differing number of observations that a single participant can
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contribute, information from each of the six insight problems were considered as
individual data points and analyzed at the level of observation where indicated.
Descriptive Statistics
Table 4 presents the descriptive statistics for mean initial representation scores by
problem and by participant, working memory span, number of correctly solved problems,
and mean solving time for correctly solved problems. Table 5 presents the solution rates
for the insight problems. Solution rates were lower than expected based on previous data
from Ash and Wiley (2006) and Ash et al. (2012). From a total of 534 problems, there
was a 24.2% success rate, while 22.3% of problems were completed with incorrect
solutions and 53.6% were left unsolved. Of correctly solved problems, the circles
problem garnered the highest solution rate (27.1%), whereas the coins problem had the
lowest solution rate (3.1%). Table 6 presents the frequency data for the four measures of
insight. Of note is the low variability within confidence for correctly solved problems.

Table 4
Descriptive Statistics for Experiment Measures
N

M

SD

95% CI
Lower Upper

Skew

Kurtosis

Initial Problem
Representation
Scores
By Problem
534
4.27
1.13
4.17
4.36
0.33
0.24
By Participant
89
4.27
0.49
4.16
4.37
0.44
0.83
a
Working Memory
89
0.00
0.93
-0.20
0.20
0.25
-0.01
Span Correctly
Total
89
1.45
1.22
1.19
1.71
0.82
0.62
b
c
SolvedSolving Time
Mean
67
123.57
63.16 108.17 138.98
0.24
-1.14
Note. N = 534; a = working memory span scores were standardized; b = for correctly
solved problems; c = twenty-two participants (24.7%) did not solve any problems.
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Table 5
Solution Rates By Problem Type
Correct
All Problems, N = 534
Matchsticks #1
Matchsticks #2
Glasses
Circles
Coins
Squares
Total

17
22
32
35
4
19
129

Correctly Solved Problems, N = 129
Matchsticks #1
Matchsticks #2
Glasses
Circles
Coins
Squares
Total

17 13.2%
22 17.1%
32 24.8%
35 27.1%
4
3.1%
19 14.7%
129 100.0%

3.2%
4.1%
6.0%
6.6%
0.7%
3.6%
24.2%

Incorrect
21
8
24
16
40
10
119

3.9%
1.5%
4.5%
3.0%
7.5%
1.9%
22.3%

Did Not Solve
51
59
33
38
45
60
286

9.6%
11.0%
6.2%
7.1%
8.4%
11.2%
53.6%

Table 6
Frequency Data for Measures of Insight
Solved
with Insight
All Problems, N = 534
Confidence
Suddenness
Effort
Impasse
Correctly Solved Problems, N =
129Confidence
Suddenness
Effort
Impasse
Note. DNS = did not solve.

107
68
60
80

20.0%
12.7%
11.2%
15.0%

Solved
without
Insight
22
4.1%
61 11.4%
69 12.9%
49
9.2%

107
68
60
80

82.9%
52.7%
46.5%
62.0%

22
61
69
49

17.1%
47.3%
53.5%
38.0%

DNS/Incorrect
405
405
405
405

75.8%
75.8%
75.8%
75.8%
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Participants felt confident about their solutions 82.9% of the time for correctly solved
problems.
Relationships Between Measures of Insight
Self-report ratings of the Aha! experience used in previous research have been
presented on a single continuum scale that encompasses several dimensions: confidence,
suddenness, and effort. Within the context of this scale, the occurrence of an insightful
solution is operationalized as the solver being highly confident in their solution (high
confidence), that the solution seemed to come suddenly (high suddenness), and that little
effort was necessary to obtain the solution (low effort). As such, it is expected that
parsing these dimensions into three unique ratings would produce strong levels of
agreement when sorting problems solved with insight and without. Further, if self-report
Aha! ratings are truly reflective of post-impasse restructuring, it is expected that they
would strongly relate to solutions categorized by the Gestalt defined occurrence of
insight, solution after impasse. To examine these relationships, a series of chi square tests
of independence were performed at the level of observation on correctly solved problems
(N = 129; see Tables 7-12 for frequency data). Chi square goodness of fit tests were then
used to isolate differences within significant relationships.

Table 7
Observed Frequencies for Confidence  Suddenness
Suddenness
High (Insight)
Low (No Insight)
Confidence
High (Insight)
61 (47.3%)
46 (35.7%)
Low (No Insight)
7 (5.4%)
15 (11.6%)
Total
68 (52.7%)
61 (47.3%)

Total
107 (82.9%)
22 (17.1%)
129 (100.0%)
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Table 8
Observed Frequencies for Suddenness  Effort
Effort
Low (Insight)
High (No Insight)
Suddenness
High (Insight)
41 (31.8%)
27 (20.9%)
Low (No Insight)
19 (14.7%)
42 (32.6%)
Total
60 (46.5%)
69 (53.5%)

Total
68 (52.7%)
61 (47.3%)
129 (100.0%)

Table 9
Observed Frequencies for Effort  Confidence
Confidence
High (Insight)
Low (No Insight)
Effort
Low (Insight)
53 (41.1%)
7 (5.4%)
High (No Insight)
54 (41.9%)
15 (11.6%)
Total
107 (82.9%)
22 (17.1%)

Total
60 (46.5%)
69 (53.5%)
129 (100.0%)

Table 10
Observed Frequencies for Impasse  Confidence
Confidence
High (Insight)
Low (No Insight)
Impasse
Yes (Insight)
64 (49.6%)
16 (12.4%)
No (No Insight)
43 (33.3%)
6 (4.7%)
Total
107 (82.9%)
22 (17.1%)

Table 11
Observed Frequencies for Impasse  Suddenness
Suddenness
High (Insight)
Low (No Insight)
Impasse
Yes (Insight)
30 (23.3%)
50 (38.8%)
No (No Insight)
38 (29.5%)
11 (8.5%)
Total
68 (52.7%)
61 (47.3%)

Total
80 (62.0%)
49 (38.0%)
129 (100.0%)

Total
80 (62.0%)
49 (38.0%)
129 (100.0%)
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Table 12
Observed Frequencies for Impasse  Effort
Effort
Low (Insight)
High (No Insight)
Impasse
Yes (Insight)
No (No Insight)
Total

22 (17.1%)
38 (29.5%)
60 (46.5%)

58 (45.0%)
11 (8.5%)
69 (53.5%)

Total
80 (62.0%)
49 (38.0%)
129 (100.0%)

Confidence  Suddenness. The data revealed a significant relationship between
confidence and suddenness, 2(1, N = 129) = 4.65, p = .031, φ = .19. However, follow up
analyses showed that this relationship was not diagnostic of the occurrence of insight
(Figure 5). Though participants who believed their answer came to them suddenly were
likely to feel very confident about their solution, 2(1, n = 68) = 42.88, p = < .001,
participants who did not experience feelings of suddenness were still very confident in
their responses, 2(1, n = 61) = 15.75, p = < .001. Participants who were highly confident
in their solution, 2(1, n = 107) = 2.10, p = .147, or had little confidence in their solution,
2(1, n = 22) = 2.91, p = .088, showed no differences between feelings of suddenness.
These results suggest that the significant relationship between confidence and suddenness
is driven by a general level of confidence in all solutions and is not related to solution
suddenness.
Suddenness  Effort. There was a significant relationship between suddenness
and effort, 2(1, N = 129) = 10.98, p = .001, φ = .29 (Figure 6). Participants who felt their
solution came to them suddenly showed no differences between feelings of effort,
2(1, n = 68) = 2.88, p = .090, but participants who did not feel their solution was sudden
reported significantly more effort was involved, 2(1, n = 61) = 8.67, p = .003.
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Confidence High (Insight)

Correctly Solved Problems

Confidence Low (No Insight)
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
High (Insight)

Low (No Insight)

Suddenness

Figure 5. Relationship between confidence and suddenness for correctly solved
problems.

Suddenness High (Insight)

Correctly Solved Problems

Suddenness Low (No Insight)
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Low (Insight)

High (No Insight)

Effort

Figure 6. Relationship between suddenness and effort for correctly solved problems.
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Effort Low (Insight)

Correctly Solved Problems

Effort High (No Insight)
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
High (Insight)

Low (No Insight)
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Figure 7. Relationship between effort and confidence for correctly solved problems.
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Figure 8. Relationship between impasse and confidence for correctly solved problems.
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Impasse Yes (Insight)

Correctly Solved Problems

Impasse No (No Insight)
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40
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Figure 9. Relationship between impasse and suddenness for correctly solved problems.
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Figure 10. Relationship between impasse and effort for correctly solved problems.
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Feelings of little effort were more often accompanied by feelings of suddenness,
2(1, n = 60) 8.07, p = .005. However, high effort was not significantly associated with
suddenness, 2(1, n = 69) = 3.26, p = .071. Though weakly associated, these constructs
did show evidence of validity when assessing Aha! experiences.
Effort  Confidence. There was no significant relationship between effort and
confidence, 2(1, N = 129) = 2.30, p = .129, φ = .13. As Figure 7 illustrates, these
constructs are unrelated aspects of the Aha! experience.
Impasse  Confidence. The data revealed no significant relationship between
impasse and confidence, 2(1, N = 129) = 1.29, p = .256, φ = .10 (Figure 8), indicating
that solvers were confident in their solutions regardless of whether they came to impasse.
Impasse  Suddenness. As suddenness and effort appear to be the only related
constructs within the Aha! rating scale, it is of particular interest how they relate to
problems solved with and without impasse. The relationship between impasse and
suddenness was significant, 2(1, N = 129) = 19.56, p = < .001, φ = .39, but follow up
analyses revealed an interesting pattern to the data (Figure 9). Participants who came to
impasse were less likely to indicate that their solution was sudden, 2(1, n = 80) 5.00,
p = .025. Participants who did not come to impasse reported high feelings of suddenness,
2(1, n = 49) = 14.88, p = < .001. There were no significant differences between coming
to impasse in solutions rated as sudden, 2(1, n = 68) = 0.94, p = .332. However,
participants who did not feel that their solution was sudden were very likely to experience
impasse, 2(1, n = 61) 24.93, p = < .001. This data pattern illustrates the opposite
relationship expected if the Aha! rating correlated with the Gestalt concept of
restructuring.
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Impasse  Effort. A similar and even stronger pattern emerged from the
significant relationship between impasse and effort, 2(1, N = 129) = 30.60, p = < .001,
φ = .49. Participants who came to impasse were more likely to rate their solutions as very
effortful, 2(1, n = 80) 16.20, p = < .001, whereas participants who did not experience
impasse were more likely to feel that their response was not effortful, 2(1, n = 49) 14.88,
p = < .001. Participants who did not feel their solution took a lot of effort were less likely
to experience impasse, 2(1, n = 60) 4.27, p = .039. Participants who felt their solution
was effortful were very likely to have experienced impasse, 2(1, n = 69) 32.01,
p = < .001. This relationship is the opposite of what is expected if impasse and effort are
convergent measures of insightful problem solving (Figure 10).
In summary, the first goal of these analyses was to determine whether the three
constructs inherent in previously used self-report Aha! rating scales showed evidence of
construct validity when separated into three distinct ratings. Our findings illustrate that
these three constructs are not strongly related when assessing the occurrence of insight.
Only the constructs of suddenness and effort appeared to be associated.
The second goal of these analyses was to determine the relationships between the
self-report Aha! ratings and solution after impasse, an operational definition designed to
reflect the Gestalt view of restructuring. Though suddenness and effort appear to be
related constructs when assessing insight, they are both inversely related to solution after
impasse, a pattern that is opposite of predications based on any theory of insight which
acknowledges that restructuring occurs in solutions attained after impasse. Therefore,
previous studies utilizing the Aha! rating scale have inappropriately categorized some
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solutions obtained without impasse as insightful experiences based on feelings of
suddenness and low effort.
Insight and Initial Problem Representation
Integral to the Gestalt theory of insight is the idea that the process to an insightful
solution begins with an inaccurate problem representation. This assumption was explored
by examining the relationships between initial problem representation and the four
different methods of operationalizing insight (high suddenness, high confidence, low
effort, or solution after impasse). This was an exploratory investigation for the three selfreport measures and an attempt to replicate results from Ash et al. (2012) for impasse. To
do this, a series of mixed model analyses of variances, which compared insightful
solutions, solutions made without insight, and problems that were not solved or had
incorrect solutions, were performed on mean initial representation scores at the level of
observation (N = 534; see Table 13 for descriptive statistics). In these analyses,
participant was included as a random effect variable. Results did not reveal differences in
initial problem representation and whether the problem solving process was experienced
as insightful for the three self-report measures: confidence, F(2, 98.93) = 0.20, p = .817,
partial η2 = .004, suddenness, F(2, 99.02) = 0.99, p = .376, partial η2 = .02, and effort,
F(2, 98.68) = 1.88, p = .159, partial η2 = .04. Only impasse produced significant
differences, F(2, 105.28) = 4.29, p = .016, partial η2 = .08 . Participants who correctly
solved problems without experiencing impasse were more likely to begin with a better
initial problem representation (M = 4.94, SE = 0.18) than solvers who came to impasse
(M = 4.11, SE = 0.13), F(1, 20.29) = 6.51, p = .019, partial η2 = .24. This supports the
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Table 13
Descriptive Statistics for Initial Representation Ratings as a Function of Insight
95% CI
n
M
SE
Lower
Upper
Confidence
High (Insight)
107
4.32
0.12
4.09
4.56
Low (No Insight)
22
4.48
0.24
4.02
4.95
Did Not Solve/Incorrect
405
4.25
0.06
4.13
4.36
Suddenness
High (Insight)
68
4.61
0.15
4.32
4.91
Low (No Insight)
61
4.20
0.15
3.90
4.50
Did Not Solve/Incorrect
405
4.25
0.06
4.13
4.36
Effort
Low (Insight)
60
4.67
0.16
4.36
4.97
High (No Insight)
69
4.14
0.14
3.87
4.41
Did Not Solve/Incorrect
405
4.25
0.06
4.13
4.36
Impasse
Yes (Insight)
80
4.11
0.13
3.86
4.37
No (No Insight)
49
4.94
0.18
4.59
5.28
Did Not Solve/Incorrect
405
4.25
0.06
4.13
4.36
Note. N = 534.

Gestalt theory of insightful problems solving and replicated findings from Ash et al.
(2012).
These results challenge the appropriateness of using the self-report Aha! ratings
as operational definitions of insight. If they captured the Gestalt concept of restructuring,
we would expect the patterns of data to mirror that of the impasse data. Though not
significant, Figure 11 illustrates that both suddenness and effort actually appear to have
the opposite pattern from what is expected: insightful experiences, i.e., problems rated
with high suddenness and low effort began from a better initial problem representation.
This is directly at odds with the assumption that insightful problem solving must begin
with an inaccurate problem representation.
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Mean Initial Problem Representation Rating

7
Insight
6

No Insight

5
4
3

2
1
0
Confidence

Suddenness

Effort

Impasse*

Did Not Solve/
Incorrect
Solution

Figure 11. Mean initial representation rating scores as a function of insight in confidence,
suddenness, effort, and impasse. Note that asterisks indicate significant differences.

Insight and Solving Time
Two specific studies found contradictory evidence regarding solution speed for
problems solved with insight. Ash et al. (2012) demonstrated that solutions obtained after
impasse came significantly slower than non-insightful solutions. Chein and Weisberg
(2013) found that insightful solutions were produced much quicker than non-insightful
solutions. One primary difference between these two studies was the operational
definition of insight. Ash et al. defined insight as solution after impasse coded by
impartial raters, while Chein and Weisberg utilized the self-report Aha! rating scale. The
current study allowed us to compare solving times using both methodologies within the
same problem set.
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A series of mixed model analyses of variances (problems solved with insight
versus problems solved without insight), in which participant was included as a random
effect variable, were performed on mean solving times at the level of observation for
correctly solved problems (N = 129; see Table 14 for descriptive statistics). No
relationship was detected between confidence and solving time, F(1, 10.22) = 0.13,
p = .731, partial η2 = .01. Using suddenness as an indicator of insight revealed a trend
towards significance, F(1, 14.51) = 3.72, p = .073, partial η2 = .20, with solutions rated as
sudden associated with faster solving times (M = 97.63, SE = 7.28) than solutions rated as
not very sudden (M = 149.65, SE = 7.38). The same effect was observed when effort was
used as the indicator for insight, F(1, 17.66) = 27.78, p = < .001, partial η2 = .61. Low
effort solutions were significantly faster (M = 69.60, SE = 6.25) than high effort solutions
(M = 154.88, SE = 5.55). Overall, this replicated Chein and Weisberg's results who found

Table 14
Descriptive Statistics for Solving Time as a Function of Insight

Confidence
High (Insight)
Low (No Insight)
Suddenness
High (Insight)
Low (No Insight)
Effort
Low (Insight)
High (No Insight)
Impasse
Yes (Insight)
No (No Insight)
Note. N = 534.

95% CI
Lower
Upper

n

M

SE

107
22

122.33
126.48

6.36
12.58

109.56
101.22

135.10
151.74

68
61

97.63
149.65

7.28
7.38

82.99
134.81

112.27
164.49

60
69

69.60
154.88

6.25
5.55

57.00
143.70

82.20
166.06

80
49

154.32
48.99

5.84
7.87

142.53
33.11

166.12
64.87
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240

Insight

220

Non-Insight

Mean Successful Solving Time (s)

200
180

160
140
120
100

80
60
40
20

0
Confidence

Suddenness

Effort*

Impasse*

Figure 12. Mean solving time as a function of insight for correctly solved problems in
confidence, suddenness, effort, and impasse. Asterisks indicate significant differences.

that problems reported as insightful, i.e., high confidence, high suddenness, and low
effort, were solved faster than problems reported with low Aha! ratings. However, when
insight was operationalized as problems solved after impasse, the opposite pattern was
found, F(1, 20.49) = 36.79, p = < .001, partial η2 = .64. Solutions after impasse were
associated with significantly slower solving times (M = 154.32, SE = 5.84) than problems
solved without impasse (M = 48.99, SE = 7.87), a replication of Ash et al. (2012). As
Figure 12 illustrates, these analyses clearly demonstrate that the contradictory results
from previous literature regarding solving time and insight are a function of how insight
was operationally defined.
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Insight and Working Memory
Working memory has been a prominent feature in research investigating the
insight problem solving process, being used to support both the Gestalt and the BusinessAs-Usual theories of insight. We continued this line of research by comparing the four
measures of insight with working memory. These analyses were conducted at the
participant level (N = 89). Consistent with previous research, overall problem solving
ability was significantly related to working memory, r(87) = .213, p = .045. We
replicated procedures used in Chein and Weisberg (2013) and created two sets of
proportions for each definition of insight: 1) number of problems solved with insight over
total number of problems; 2) number of problems solved without insight over total
number of problems; 3) number of problems solved with insight over total number of
problems less problems solved without insight; and 4) number of problems solved
without insight over the total number of problems less problems solved with insight (see
Table 15 for descriptive statistics). The last two proportions were included as more
precise measures of individual differences in success at insightful or non-insightful
problem solving. After calculating these proportions for each of the four operational
definitions of insight—high confidence, high suddenness, low effort, and impasse after
solution—we then correlated these proportions with working memory scores. The two
different methods for calculating the proportions did not produce major differences
between the correlations with working memory (Table 16). Therefore, we discuss the
results in terms of the proportions calculated using the total number of problems.
For the self-report ratings assessed as insightful, the proportions of problems
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Table 15
Descriptive Statistics for Proportions of Problems Solved
95% CI
Proportion Solved / Total # Problems
Confidence
Proportion Solved with Insight /
Total # Problems
Proportion Solved with No Insight /
Total # Problems
Proportion Solved with Insight /
Total # Problems Less No Insight
Proportion Solved with No Insight /
Total # Problems Less Insight
Suddenness
Proportion Solved with Insight /
Total # Problems
Proportion Solved with No Insight /
Total # Problems
Proportion Solved with Insight /
Total # Problems Less No Insight
Proportion Solved with No Insight /
Total # Problems Less Insight
Effort
Proportion Solved with Insight /
Total # Problems
Proportion Solved with No Insight /
Total # Problems
Proportion Solved with Insight /
Total # Problems Less No Insight
Proportion Solved with No Insight /
Total # Problems Less Insight
Impasse
Proportion Solved with Insight /
Total # Problems
Proportion Solved with No Insight /
Total # Problems
Proportion Solved with Insight /
Total # Problems Less No Insight
Proportion Solved with No Insight /
Total # Problems Less Insight
Note. N = 89.

M

SD

Lower

Upper

Skew

Kurt

0.24

0.20

0.20

0.28

0.82

0.62

0.20

0.21

0.16

0.24

1.16

1.21

0.04

0.08

0.02

0.06

1.79

2.45

0.20

0.21

0.16

0.24

1.15

1.18

0.05

0.09

0.03

0.07

1.79

2.37

0.13

0.18

0.09

0.17

1.72

3.04

0.11

0.15

0.08

0.15

1.27

1.38

0.13

0.18

0.09

0.17

1.72

3.03

0.13

0.16

0.09

0.16

1.09

0.36

0.11

0.17

0.08

0.15

1.74

2.72

0.13

0.14

0.10

0.16

0.82

0.01

0.11

0.18

0.08

0.15

1.75

2.79

0.15

0.16

0.12

0.18

0.70

-0.53

0.15

0.14

0.12

0.18

0.74

-0.10

0.09

0.16

0.06

0.13

2.46

6.71

0.15

0.15

0.12

0.18

0.70

-0.17

0.11

0.19

0.07

0.14

2.32

5.72

.203
.198
.050

Suddenness

Effort

Impasse

Note. * < .05.

.254*

Confidence

r(WM, Insight/Total)

.220*

.066

.047

-.114

r(WM, No Insight/Total)

Relationships Between Working Memory Span and Insight

Table 16

.056

.199

.204

.254*

r(WM, Insight/[Total-No Insight])

.226*

.132

.103

-.096

r(WM, No Insight/[Total-Insight])
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solved with high confidence were significantly correlated with working memory,
r(87) = .254, p = .016. High suddenness, r(87) = .203, p = .056, and low effort,
r(87) = .198, p = .063, also showed the same positive relationships with working
memory. No significant relationships were found between working memory and the
proportions of problems solved without insight, i.e., low confidence, low suddenness, and
high effort. Overall, this replicated results reported by Chein and Weisberg (2013) which
were interpreted as evidence that Type 2 processes are involved with restructuring.
However, when insight was operationalized as solution after impasse, there was
no evidence of a relationship between the proportion of problems solved with insight and
working memory, r(87) = .050, p = .644. Further, the proportion of problems solved
without impasse was significantly related to working memory, r(87) = .220, p = .038.
This replicates previous research that has shown no relationship between working
memory and restructuring in insightful problem solving (Ash & Wiley, 2006; Fleck,
2008; Gilhooly & Fioratou, 2009). Therefore, when insight is operationally defined as
solution after impasse, our results match predictions made by automatic restructuring
theories. However, when insight is operationally defined in terms of self-report Aha!
experiences, we find evidence predicted by the Business-As-Usual theory of insight.
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CHAPTER 4
CONCLUSIONS

Many studies have used a self-report Aha! rating scale to determine the
occurrence of insight (e.g., Bowden & Jung-Beeman, 2003; Chein & Weisberg, 2013;
Jung-Beeman et al., 2004). In this study, we investigated whether this was a valid way to
assess insightful problem solving experiences. The anchors of this scale—strategic and
insight, constructs that are not extremes on the same continuum—are described in terms
of solution confidence, how sudden a solution manifests, and the effort required during
the solving process. Of concern is that these multi-barreled instructions create the
potential for response confusion. Our data clearly suggests that this is the case.
Separating this scale into its three unique subcomponents reveals little in the way to
support construct validity. Confidence is not related to either suddenness or effort and
although suddenness and effort do appear to be related, it is a weaker association that
does not justify their combination into a single measurement. When presenting these
three fairly independent constructs as a single scale, participants must choose their
response given which element is most salient to them at the time, inadvertently creating
what is essentially three different dependent variables.
Our data further demonstrate that the Aha! rating scale is wholly unrelated to the
Gestalt defined concept of restructuring, the key to all investigations regarding the insight
problem solving process. The Gestalt theory of insight is based on the assumptions that
insightful solutions begin from an inaccurate initial problem representation and that
restructuring, the process of overcoming this faulty problem space and formulating the
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correct problem representation, occurs only after a period of impasse. When operationally
defining insight based on the criteria of solution after impasse, we found no evidence of
convergent validity with any of the self-report definitions of insight: high confidence,
high suddenness, or low effort. Confidence was unrelated to impasse after solution. High
suddenness and low effort were actually associated with solutions obtained without
impasse.
We also found that participants solving after impasse began with a less
appropriate initial problem representation than those who solved without impasse, a
pattern predicted by Gestalt theory. However, the three self-report ratings were not
significantly associated with initial problem representation. This anomalous pattern was
repeated when assessing solving time. Solutions after impasse were significantly
associated with slower solving times, a result that is predicted by Gestalt theory. If a
solver must exhaust a faulty problem representation before coming to impasse, it stands
to reason that it would take longer to acquire a solution than if the solver began with an
accurate problem representation. Of the self-report ratings, confidence was unrelated to
solving time and suddenness and effort were, again, predictive of the opposite pattern
than expected: solutions rated with high suddenness and low effort were produced at a
faster rate.
In total, the data present no evidence that the self-report Aha! ratings are at all
appropriate in assessing Gestalt defined restructuring. Further, our results indicate that
participants interpreted suddenness and effort as reflecting solutions that came quickly
and easily, i.e., did not involve impasse and started from a more accurate problem
representation. This suggests that previous studies using the Aha! rating scale have, at
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least in part, erroneously classified solutions as insightful with no instance of impasse or
restructuring. This has resulted in data patterns that may be contrary to what is expected
from the Gestalt view of insightful problem solving, explaining some of the discrepancies
found in the literature.
Our final set of analyses corroborates previous research supporting competing
theories of insightful problem solving, providing further evidence that different
operational definitions of insight are driving contradictory findings. Analyzing the
relationship between insight and working memory, we demonstrated that assessing
insight with the Aha! ratings resulted in support for the Business-As-Usual theory, while
assessing insight as solution after impasse supported the Gestalt theory of insight. These
differences can be attributed to the miscategorization of quick and easy solutions as
involving restructuring, when they actually were neither misrepresented nor involved the
occurrence of impasse.
Our results clearly illustrate that the self-report Aha! rating scale lacks validity.
The profound implication of this statement is that over a decade of research using this
scale as the sole means of assessing restructuring has produced questionable results.
Further, our data imply that the feelings traditionally associated with an Aha! experience
are not necessarily indicative of the underlying processes. Many researchers have
overemphasized the importance of these feelings and presented the Aha! experience as
synonymous with restructuring with little evidence that these constructs are reliably
related (see Ash et al., 2009, for review of this issue). While our results indicated that the
subjective Aha! experience is not an appropriate method for assessing restructuring, they
clearly support that focusing on how a person overcomes impasse is. By this definition,
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our work consistently demonstrated support for the Gestalt theory that restructuring is a
component specific to the insight problem solving process with the deeper implication
that modern information processing theories grounded in this view accurately assume that
this process is largely automatic.
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INFORMED CONSENT DOCUMENT

INFORMED CONSENT DOCUMENT
OLD DOMINION UNIVERSITY
PROJECT TITLE: Working Memory and Problem Solving
INTRODUCTION
The purposes of this form are to give you information that may affect your decision whether to say
YES or NO to participation in this research, and to record the consent of those who say YES to
participation in this study.
RESEARCHERS
Responsible Project Investigator:
Ivan K. Ash, Ph.D.
Assistant Professor
College of Sciences
Department of Psychology
Old Dominion University
iash@odu.edu
757-683-4446

Investigator:
Kimberly D. Lee
Master's Candidate
College of Sciences
Department of Psychology
Old Dominion University
kleex027@odu.edu
757-683-4439

DESCRIPTION OF RESEARCH STUDY
This experiment investigates how people solve cognitive problems. Pending your voluntary
consent, you will participate in a one-hour (approximately) experiment. You will be asked to solve
a series of word problems, puzzle problems, memory tasks, as well as answer questions about
your opinion on different aspects of these problems. Afterwards, you will be debriefed by the
experimenter and will have an opportunity to ask any questions that you may have about this
experiment before leaving. Approximately 300 volunteers will be participating in this study.
Video Recording:
One section of this experiment will be video recorded for later data collection. During this section,
you will be asked to solve problems while verbalizing your mental problem solving processes.
Your anonymity and confidentially is of utmost importance. The video will be recorded on a closed
computer that is not connected to the internet nor can be otherwise accessed by any other
computer. In the video, you will only be identified by your participant number and that number
cannot be linked to your name or SONA I.D. number. After we have collected the data from the
video, the video will be deleted. At no time will any portion of the video footage or images from
the video footage be used for presentation or publishing purposes.
EXCLUSIONARY CRITERIA
You must be at least 18 years of age and have normal or corrected-to-normal vision.
RISKS AND BENEFITS
RISKS: There are no substantial risks for participants in this study. However, as with any
research, there is always the possibility that you may be subject to risks that have not yet been
identified. If at any point during the course of the experiment you feel uncomfortable, remember
that your participation is voluntary and you may end your participation at any time without penalty.
BENEFITS: There are no direct benefits from participating in this study.
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COSTS AND PAYMENTS
All participants will receive 1.5 Psychology Research Participation (SONA) credit for participation
in this study.
NEW INFORMATION
If the researchers find new information during this study that would reasonably change your
decision about participating, then they will give it to you.
CONFIDENTIALITY
All information obtained about you in this study is strictly confidential unless disclosure is required
by law. The results of this study may be used in reports, presentations and publications. All
results will be reported in the aggregate, and the researcher will not identify you. Although your
name and email were used to make your appointment and will be used to assign research credit,
you will be assigned a participant number which cannot be connected to this information. This
number will be used to organize all your responses. Therefore, your identity can never be
associated with your questionnaire responses or performance data. Your responses will be held
in strict confidentiality, in accordance and observation with ethical guidelines established by the
American Psychological Association (APA).
WITHDRAWAL PRIVILEGE
It is OK for you to say NO. Even if you say YES now, you are free to say NO later, and walk away
or withdraw from the study at any time. Your decision will not affect your relationship with Old
Dominion University, or otherwise cause a loss of benefits to which you might otherwise be
entitled. Also, the investigators reserve the right to withdraw your participation at any time
throughout this investigation.
COMPENSATION FOR ILLNESS AND INJURY
If you say YES, then your voluntary consent in this document does not waive any of your legal
rights. It is highly improbable and unlikely that any illness or injury will result from your
participation with this research project. However, in the event of any harm arising from this study,
neither Old Dominion University nor the researchers are able to give you any money, insurance
coverage, free medical care, or any other compensation for such injury. In the event that you
suffer harm as a result of participation in this research project, you may contact the Responsible
Project Investigator, Dr. Ivan Ash at 757-683-4446, the current IRB chair, Dr. George Maihafer at
757-683-4520, or the Old Dominion University Office of Research at 757-683-3460 who will be
glad to review the matter with you.
VOLUNTARY CONSENT
By signing this form, you are saying several things. You are saying that you have read this form
or have had it read to you, that you are satisfied that you understand this form, the research
study, and its risks and benefits. The researchers should have answered any questions you may
have had about the research. If you have any questions later on, please contact the Responsible
Project Investigator, Dr. Ivan Ash, at 757-683-4446.
If at any time you feel pressured to participate, or if you have any questions about your rights or
this form, then you should call Dr. George Maihafer, the current IRB chair, at 757-683-4520, or
the Old Dominion University Office of Research, at 757-683-3460.
And importantly, by signing below, you are telling the researcher YES, that you agree to
participate in this study. The researcher should give you a copy of this form for your records.

Participant's Printed Name

Participant's Signature

Date
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INVESTIGATOR’S STATEMENT
I certify that I have explained to this subject the nature and purpose of this research, including
benefits, risks, costs, and any experimental procedures. I have described the rights and
protections afforded to human subjects and have done nothing to pressure, coerce, or falsely
entice this subject into participating. I am aware of my obligations under state and federal laws,
and promise compliance. I have answered the subject's questions and have encouraged him/her
to ask additional questions at any time during the course of this study. I have witnessed the
above signature(s) on this consent form.

Investigator's Printed Name

Investigator's Signature

Date
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APPENDIX B
INSIGHT PROBLEMS

In the problem below, matchsticks form Roman numerals in an equation. Notice that both
sides of the equation are not equal. Make these matchsticks into a correct arithmetic
equation by moving only a single matchstick. The specific rules are:
A) Only one matchstick can be moved.
B) A matchstick cannot be discarded; that is, it can only be moved from one
position in the equation to another.
C) An upright matchstick cannot count as a slanted stick, so
is not
.
D) The result must be a correct arithmetic equation.
Move one matchstick to make the following into a correct equation.

Figure B1. Matchsticks operator problem.
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In the problem below, matchsticks form Roman numerals in an equation. Notice that both
sides of the equation are not equal. Make these matchsticks into a correct arithmetic
equation by moving only a single matchstick. The specific rules are:
A) Only one matchstick can be moved.
B) A matchstick cannot be discarded; that is, it can only be moved from one
position in the equation to another.
C) An upright matchstick cannot count as a slanted stick, so
is not
.
D) The result must be a correct arithmetic equation.
Move one matchstick to make the following into a correct equation.

Figure B2. Matchsticks numeral problem.
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This problem consists of 6 glasses. The first 3 glasses contain liquid. Describe how you
could make it so no 2 glasses containing liquid are next to each other and no 2 empty
glasses are next to each other, while keeping 3 of the 6 glasses full. To do this, you are
only allowed to move 1 glass.

Figure B3. Glasses problem.
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In this problem, individual circles form a triangle that points to the top of the page. Move
3 circles only to get the triangle to point to the bottom of the page.

Figure B4. Circles problem.
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In this problem, there are 8 coins. Move 2 coins so that each coin touches exactly 3 other
coins. The coins must be separated into two groups.

Figure B5. Coins problem.
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Move 3 of the sticks to make 5 squares.

Figure B6. Squares problem.
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APPENDIX C
AHA! RATINGS

Sometimes when we solve a problem, we feel unsure that our answer is the correct
solution (Not Confident). Other times, we feel absolutely certain that the answer we have
come up with is correct (Very Confident).
How confident are you in your solution? Not Confident (1) to Very Confident (4)

Sometimes when we solve a problem, we feel like we consistently make progress towards
the solution; that we take incremental steps that lead to the final solution and the solution
didn't just come "out of the blue" (Not Sudden). Other times, we can work on a problem
and not feel as though we are making any progress towards a solution, but the solution
will just "pop into our head" (Very Sudden).
How sudden did the solution come to you? Not Sudden (1) to Very Sudden (4)

Sometimes when we solve a problem, the answer comes to us easily, without having to
use a lot of mental effort (Not Effortful). Other times, we have to think very hard and it
feels like it takes a lot of mental work to come up with a solution (Very Effortful).
How much effort was required to find the solution? Not Effortful (1) to Very Effortful (4)
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APPENDIX D
READING SPAN STIMULI

No matter how much we talk to him, he is never going to change.
The prosecutor's dish was lost because it was not based on fact.
Every now and then I catch myself swimming blankly at the wall.

?
?
?

J
M
F

We were fifty lawns out at sea before we lost sight of land.
Throughout the entire ordeal, the hostages never appeared to lose hope.
Paul is afraid of heights and refuses to fly on a plane.
The young pencil kept his eyes closed until he was told to look.
Most people who laugh are concerned about controlling their weight.

?
?
?
?
?

X
L
R
B
Q

When Lori shops she always looks for the lowest flood.
When I get up in the morning, the first thing I do is feed my dog.
After yelling at the game, I knew I would have a tall voice.

?
?
?

H
M
X

Mary was asked to stop at the new mall to pick up several items.
When it is cold, my mother always makes me wear a cap on my head.

?
?

L
Q

All parents hope their list will grow up to be intelligent.
When John and Amy moved to Canada, their wish had a huge garage sale.
In the fall, my gift and I love to work together in the yard.
At church yesterday morning, Jim's daughter made a terrible plum.
Unaware of the hunter, the deer wandered into his shotgun range.

?
?
?
?
?

H
B
F
R
J

Since it was the last game, it was hard to cope with the loss.
Because she gets to knife early, Amy usually gets a good parking spot.
The only furniture Steve had in his first bowl was his waterbed.
Last year, Mike was given detention for running in the hall.

?
?
?
?

J
B
R
Q

The huge clouds covered the morning slide and the rain began to fall.
After one date I knew that Linda's sister simply was not my type.

?
?

X
M

Jason broke his arm when he fell from the tree onto the ground.
Most people agree that Monday is the worst stick of the week.
On warm sunny afternoons, I like to take a walk in the park.
With intense determination he overcame all obstacles and won the race.

?
?
?
?

H
L
F
B

A person should never be discriminated against based on his race.
My mother has always told me that it is not polite to shine.
The lemonade players decided to play two out of three sets.

?
?
?

M
L
F
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Raising children requires a lot of dust and the ability to be firm.
The gathering crowd turned to look when they heard the gun shot.
As soon as I get done taking this envy I am going to go home.
Sue opened her purse and found she did not have any money.
Jill wanted a garden in her backyard, but the soil was mostly clay.

?
?
?
?
?

H
J
X
Q
R

Stacey stopped dating the light when she found out he had a wife.
I told the class that they would get a surprise if they were orange.

?
?

F
R

Jim was so tired of studying, he could not read another page.
Although Joe is sarcastic at times, he can also be very sweet.
Carol will ask her sneaker how much the flight to Mexico will cost.
The sugar could not believe he was being offered such a great deal.

?
?
?
?

Q
X
L
H
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APPENDIX E
OPERATION SPAN STIMULI

IS (10 ÷ 2) – 3 = 2
IS (10 ÷ 10) – 1 = 2
IS (7 ÷ 1) + 2 = 7

?
?
?

sea
class
paint

–2=3
–1=1
+ 3 = 13
+ 1 = 18
–7=4

?
?
?
?
?

cloud
pipe
ear
flame
bike

(8 x 4) – 2 = 32
(9 x 3) – 3 = 24
(4 ÷ 1) + 1 = 4

?
?
?

bean
arm
ground

IS (10 ÷ 1) – 1 = 9
IS (8 x 4) + 2 = 34

?
?

hole
dad

IS
IS
IS
IS
IS

(6 x 3)
(6 ÷ 3)
(6 x 2)
(8 ÷ 2)
(8 ÷ 2)

+ 2 = 17
+2=5
– 3 = 10
+4=2
–1=3

?
?
?
?
?

kid
fork
jail
hat
lamp

IS
IS
IS
IS

(9 ÷ 1)
(6 ÷ 2)
(7 x 2)
(6 x 2)

–5=4
–2=2
– 1 = 14
– 2 = 10

?
?
?
?

cave
back
hall
fern

IS
IS

(2 x 2) + 1 = 4
(7 x 1) + 6 = 13

?
?

man
world

IS (10 ÷ 1) + 1 = 10
IS (4 x 4) + 1 = 17
IS (3 x 3) – 1 = 8

?
?
?

calf
fish
cheek

IS
IS
IS

?
?
?

bread
germ
dock

IS (3 ÷ 1)
IS (2 x 1)
IS (10 ÷ 1)
IS (9 x 2)
IS (9 ÷ 1)
IS
IS
IS

(3 x 1) + 2 = 2
(4 ÷ 2) + 1 = 6
(5 ÷ 5) + 1 = 2

IS (2 x 3) + 1 = 4
IS (9 ÷ 3) – 2 = 1
IS (10 ÷ 2) – 4 = 3
IS (5 ÷ 1) + 4 = 9
IS (10 x 2) + 3 = 23

?
?
?
?
?

game
nerve
wax
tin
church

IS
IS

(7 ÷ 1) + 6 = 12
(3 x 2) + 1 = 6

?
?

beach
card

IS
IS
IS
IS

(6 x 4)
(9 ÷ 3)
(8 ÷ 1)
(9 x 1)

?
?
?
?

job
cone
brass
street

+ 1 = 25
–1=2
–6=4
+9=1
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